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REVISITED 
“The day may come when we must decide whether a legislature may 
deliberately and unequivocally resolve upon a penalty authorizing capital 
punishment for crimes committed at the age of 15.”2 
-Justice O’Connor 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
From colonial times through the late 1800s, children and adults were tried and 
sentenced in the same penal system.  In 1899, Illinois established the first juvenile 
justice system in an effort to separate juveniles from adult crimes and punishments.3  
Almost a century later, with all fifty states having implemented a juvenile justice 
                                                                
1William Shakespeare, Macbeth (The Three Witches). 
2Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 855 (1988). 
3Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of the Child?, 26 
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 147, 162 (1995). 
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system, the rehabilitative capabilities of such systems have come under attack as the 
nation is confronted with stories that a fifteen-year-old boy sodomized and murdered 
an eleven-year-old boy who was selling candy door-to-door.4  Another fifteen-year-
old shot and killed a woman on her way home from work so he could “know what it 
felt like to kill somebody.”5   
A fourteen-year-old opened-fire on a morning prayer meeting at a local high 
school, killing three.6  A thirteen-year-old sodomized and murdered a four-year-old 
who was on his way to summer camp.7  Another thirteen-year-old murdered his 
friend for his refusal to accept the apology of another child,8 while a ten- and eleven-
year-old pushed a young child fourteen stories to his death for his refusal to steal 
candy.9  Most recently, an eleven- and thirteen-year-old evacuated their elementary 
school by triggering the fire alarm.  They opened-fire on the unsuspecting school 
yard with their stolen hunting rifles, killing five--four students and one teacher.10 
The issue of whether children as young as these could receive the death penalty 
was squarely confronted by the United States Supreme Court in Thompson v. 
Oklahoma11 and Stanford v. Kentucky.12  Under Thompson, a fifteen-year-old may 
not be executed.13  Under Stanford, sixteen-year-olds may be sentenced to death.14  
However, Justice O’Connor warned, in her Thompson concurrence, that reliable 
evidence will one day become available to ascertain the moral and criminal 
culpabilities of fifteen-year-old murderers.15  As a result, a national consensus could 
develop in favor of reducing the minimum age of juvenile death eligibility to fifteen 
and under. 
The standard used to determine whether execution for children is constitutionally 
permitted is whether such executions comport with the “evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”16  That standard remains 
undefined.  The Court instead has relied upon relevant legislative enactments and an 
analysis of jury behavior as objective indicators of our evolving standards of 
decency.  Thus, the Court, in large part, has placed the power of constitutional 
                                                                
4Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 24, 1997). 
5NBC Nightly News (Dec. 26, 1997). 
6The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 2, 1997). 
7Ben Dobbin, Parents of Slain 4-Year-Old Still Struggle 4 Years Later, BUFF. NEWS, Aug. 
10, 1997, at A22.  
8CBS Evening News (Sept. 3, 1994). 
9CBS Evening News (Oct. 14, 1994). 
10Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 27, 1998). 
11Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
12Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
13Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838. 
14Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380. 
15Thompson, 487 U.S. at 855. 
16Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
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interpretation in the hands of legislators.  Politicians, not the judiciary, will 
ultimately determine what punishments are cruel and unusual under the Eighth 
Amendment.  If, as a society, we allow for a reduction in the minimum age of death-
eligibility and the resulting executions of children ages fifteen and younger, the end 
result is that our standards of decency will become indecent.  If the death penalty 
becomes an option for children under sixteen, the unavoidable conclusion must be 
that we have reverted back to colonial theories of punishment.  Therefore, children 
between the ages of seven and fourteen will be subjected to execution.  The issue 
facing the nation will again become at what age to draw the line.  In this article I 
argue that, as a society, we must prevent such executions and refute claims that, as a 
result of the failure of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate killers before they 
kill, a consensus in favor of reducing the minimum age of execution has evolved.  
Otherwise, our “standards of indecency” will have become wicked. 
Part II of this note presents the theories of colonial crime and punishment, which 
ultimately led to the creation and waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.  Parts III and IV 
discuss the history of the United States capital punishment system, with an emphasis 
on its application to juveniles through the landmark United States Supreme Court 
decisions in Thompson v. Oklahoma and Stanford v. Kentucky.  Part V examines the 
impact of recent juvenile murders on our evolving standards of decency, in light of 
the political manipulation of the dual misperceptions that juvenile crime is on the rise 
and that juvenile murderers are not amenable to rehabilitation.  Finally, I conclude by 
warning against a reversion back to colonial theories of punishment by imposing 
death upon children under sixteen. 
II.  HISTORY OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 
From the seventeenth- through nineteenth-centuries, children and adults were 
tried for their crimes in the same criminal justice system.  Children found guilty of 
their offenses were subjected to adult punishments, including execution.  In 1899, 
Illinois created the first juvenile justice system to remedy the injustice of trying and 
punishing children as adults.17  The juvenile justice system emphasizes treatment and 
rehabilitation as opposed to punishment. 
A.  Colonial Crime and Punishment 
Prior to the creation of the juvenile justice system, colonial courts relied on 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, which were published in 1768 and established the 
common law principles of both criminal and moral culpability for children.18  
According to Blackstone, children under the age of seven lacked the capacity to 
formulate criminal intent.19  A rebuttable presumption of capacity to commit a 
criminal offense applied to children between the ages of seven and fourteen.20  If the 
                                                                
17Strater, supra note 3. 
18Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death Penalty for 
Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 42 DE PAUL L. REV. 1311, 1314 (1993). 
19Etta J. Mullin, At What Age Should They Die?  The United States Supreme Court 
Decision with Respect to Juvenile Offenders and the Death Penalty, Stanford v. Kentucky and 
Wilkins v. Missouri, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 161, 163 (1990). 
20Id.  
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presumption of capacity was successfully rebutted, such that the child was found to 
appreciate the difference between right and wrong, the child could be convicted of a 
criminal offense and thus subjected to adult punishments, including death.21 
In accordance with Blackstone’s principles, the colonial courts sentenced two 
boys, ages eight and ten, to death, along with a thirteen-year-old girl who was burned 
to death.22  In 1885, a ten-year-old Cherokee Indian was hanged.23 
B.  Creation of the Juvenile Justice System 
A reform movement in the 1890s sparked the creation of a juvenile justice system 
to protect children from both the adult penal system and execution.24  The first 
juvenile justice system was created in Illinois in 1899.25  The theory behind the 
juvenile justice system is that juveniles are less criminally and morally responsible 
than are adults, as they lack the same capacity to commit criminal offenses.  Because 
children are less blameworthy and lack the discipline to exercise self-control, they 
are likewise more prone to rehabilitation than are adults.  Therefore, the theory is 
that children should be clinically treated as opposed to punished in the adult penal 
system.26 
The rehabilitative treatment theory underlying the juvenile justice system has 
recently come under attack with the increased publicity of brutal murders committed 
by children. Along with the increased publicity comes the politically-fueled and 
media-fed misperception that the juvenile justice system’s efforts to rehabilitate 
these children has failed.  Thus, the perception is that the only viable alternative is to 
lower the minimum age of execution.   
                                                                
21Id. 
22Nanda, supra note 18. 
23Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 829 n.27. 
24Sherri Jackson, Too Young to Die--Juveniles and the Death Penalty--A Better Alternative 
to Killing our Children: Youth Empowerment, 22 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 
391, 394 (1996).  See also Glenn M. Bieler, Death be not Proud: A Note on Juvenile Capital 
Punishment, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 179, 198 (1990).  See also In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 
14-16 (1967). 
25Strater, supra note 3. 
26Mullin, supra note 19, at 162.  See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1967).  Robert H. 
Mnookin et al, Child, Family, and State 3 at 1097-98 (1995).  According to Anthony M. Platt, 
there are nine ideal points of a reformatory scheme: 
(1) segregation of young deviants from adult deviants; (2) removal of deviant children 
from unsound environments to reformatories for their own good; (3)denial of the need 
for trial or due process legal trappings in the removal process because reformatories 
helped rather than hurt; (4) indeterminate commitments; (5) denial of sentimentality 
and resort to punishment where it became a necessary means to reform; (6) military 
drill, physical exercise, labor, and constant supervision to protect reformatory inmates 
from idleness and indulgence; (7) cottage plan physical plants in rural locations; (8) 
tripartite school program based on elementary education, industrial and agricultural 
training, and religious education; and (9) constant training in the value of sobriety, 
thrift, industry, prudence, realistic ambition, and life adjustment.  Id. 
All fifty states and Puerto Rico now have a juvenile justice system where juveniles are tried 
separately from adults for their offenses. 
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As an alternative to adult sanctions, the juvenile “rehabilitation” theory should be 
re-examined.  If the juvenile justice system truly did provide treatment and 
rehabilitation for children, those same children would be less likely to reappear in 
juvenile court facing transfer into the adult penal system for subsequent criminal 
acts.  Indeed, the failure of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate juveniles rests 
not on the inability of juveniles to be rehabilitated. Instead, the failure lies in the 
system’s inability to rehabilitate.  
III.  HISTORY OF THE DEATH PENALTY AND ITS APPLICATION TO CHILDREN 
The United States Supreme Court has held that while youth is a relevant 
mitigating factor to be considered when assessing a juvenile murderer’s moral and 
criminal culpability, it is not cruel and unusual punishment to execute sixteen-year-
olds who kill. Sixteen-year-olds are presumed to possess the requisite maturity to 
contemplate and be held accountable for their actions.  In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
the U.S. Supreme Court established that it is unconstitutional to execute children 
under sixteen years of age.27  However, Justice O’Connor warned that the day may 
present itself where we will have to reconsider whether fifteen-year-olds possess the 
necessary culpability to be worthy of death.28  Some argue that the dawn of that day 
has come.   
The standard by which the Court determines whether death is constitutionally 
permissible for children was first articulated in Trop v. Dulles.29  According to the 
Court, the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment “must 
draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society.”30  In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court adopted the standard 
articulated in Trop v. Dulles when determining that executing children fifteen and 
younger offends our “evolving standards of decency.”31  However, the Court, instead 
of defining the contours of “evolving standards of decency,” declared that we 
determine evolving standards of decency in light of objective indicia such as relevant 
legislative enactments and jury behavior.32  Thus, the standard is standardless.  In 
light of the fact that the standard has remained undefined and in light of the recent 
publicity of juvenile crimes, some legislators are challenging the holding of 
Thompson and are lobbying for a reduction in the minimum age of execution. 
In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the issue before the Court was whether it is cruel and 
unusual punishment to execute persons who were fifteen-years of age at the time of 
their offenses.33  In the early morning hours of January 23, 1983, William Wayne 
Thompson, along with three older accomplices, savagely murdered Charles Keene, 
Thompson’s former brother-in-law.34  Thompson severely beat Keene before 
                                                                
27487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988). 
28Id. at 855. 
29Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
30Id. at 99. 
31487 U.S. at 821. 
32Id. at 821-22. 
33Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 815, 818-19 (1988). 
34Id. at 819. 
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shooting him twice, once in the head and once in the chest, and cut his throat, chest, 
and abdomen.35  Keene’s leg was broken and he received severe lacerations to the 
head and face.36  Thompson and his accomplices then chained Keene to a concrete 
block and dumped his body in the Washita River, where it was discovered 
approximately two weeks later.37  Thompson’s alleged motivation for the murder was 
retaliation for the abuse Keene inflicted on his wife--Thompson’s sister.38  Thompson 
and his three accomplices were tried separately and each was sentenced to death.39  
William Wayne Thompson was fifteen when he brutally murdered Charles Keene.40   
The question before the Court was whether Thompson’s death sentence was 
constitutional.41  In a plurality opinion, with Justice O’Connor concurring in the 
judgment, the Court concluded that the execution of a capital murderer who was 
fifteen at the time of his offense was cruel and unusual punishment, as it violated 
evolving standards of decency.42  Instead of defining “evolving standards of 
decency,” the Court reasoned that a determination of whether a punishment offends 
evolving standards of decency requires an analysis of two objective factors: 1) 
relevant legislative enactments; and 2) the behavior of juries to establish a national 
consensus.43   
The plurality considered as relevant legislative enactments, the fact that 
Oklahoma law forbids voting, participation on a jury, marriage without parental 
consent, and the purchase of alcohol and cigarettes by minors.44  Furthermore, 
Oklahoma’s juvenile justice system forbids most offenders under age eighteen to be 
held criminally liable for their offenses.45  In fact Oklahoma’s civil and penal statutes 
defined persons under eighteen as “children.”46   
The Court deemed most relevant the fact that all fifty states had enacted 
legislation setting the maximum age for juvenile jurisdiction at sixteen.47  The Court 
reasoned that “all of this legislation is consistent with the experience of mankind, as 
                                                                
35Id. 
36Id. 
37Id. 
38Thompson, 487 U.S. at 819. 
39Id. 
40Id. at 819.  See also Dominic J. Ricotta, Eighth Amendment -- the Death Penalty for 
Juveniles: A State’s Right or a Child’s Injustice?  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 79 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 921, 921-22 (1988). 
41Thompson, 487 U.S. at 818-19. 
42Id. at 838. 
43Id. at 822. 
44Id. at 823. 
45Id. at 823-824. 
46Thompson, 487 U.S. at 824. 
47Id. 
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well as the long history of our law, that the normal fifteen-year-old is not prepared to 
assume the full responsibilities of an adult.”48   
The Court further noted that the majority of jurisdictions failed to specify a 
minimum age at which a juvenile is eligible for execution.49  Eighteen states that had 
established a minimum age drew the line at sixteen.50  Therefore, based upon relevant 
legislative enactments, the plurality concluded that death for children fifteen years of 
age at the time of the offense violated evolving standards of decency.51 
The Court next considered the behavior of juries in capital cases and their 
decisions to impose life or death.  Statistics recorded throughout the 1980s and 
presented to the Court indicated that a disproportionately small number of willful 
criminal homicide offenders sentenced to death were minors.52  Out of the 82,094 
persons arrested for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, 1,393 were sentenced 
to death.53  Only five of those persons, which included William Wayne Thompson, 
were under sixteen years of age upon commission of the offense.54  According to the 
Court, these statistics “suggest that these five young offenders have received 
sentences that are ‘cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightening 
is cruel and unusual.’”55 
                                                                
48Id. at 824-25. 
49Id. at 826. 
50Id. at 829 n.30. 1) California (age 18); 2) Colorado (age 18); 3) Connecticut (age 18); 4) 
Georgia (age 17); 5) Illinois (age 18); 6) Indiana (age 16); 7) Kentucky (age 16); 8) Maryland 
(age 18); 9) Nebraska (age 18); 10) Nevada (age 16); 11) New Hampshire (age 17); 12) New 
Jersey (age 18); 13) New Mexico (age 18); 14) North Carolina (age 17); 15) Ohio (age 18); 
16) Oregon (age 18); Tennessee (age 18); and Texas (age 17). 
51Thompson, 487 U.S. at 838. 
52Id. at 832. 
53Id. at 832. 
54Id. at 832-33. 
55Id. at 833 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 309).  See also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837.  See 
also Gregg, 428 U.S. at 835.  The Thompson plurality next turned to a discussion of the goals 
of capital punishment as announced in Gregg -- deterrence and retribution. 
 
Deterrence 
The plurality reasoned that specific and general deterrence goals are not met with the 
infliction of death upon children who are fifteen at the time of their offense because children 
are less blameworthy and responsible than are adults.  The likelihood that teenagers, being less 
rational than adults, will engage in a “cost-benefit analysis” is “so remote as to be virtually 
nonexistent.”  Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837.  Even if a fifteen-year-old would balance the pros 
against the cons before committing murder, he or she would very doubtfully consider the 
death penalty as a possible sanction based on the small number of executions during the 
twentieth-century.  Id.  Therefore, the juvenile death penalty for offenders under age sixteen 
fails to serve as a deterrent.  Id. 
 
Retribution 
In Gregg, the Court announced that the test for determining whether a punishment serves 
retributive ends turns on whether “an expression of society’s moral outrage at particularly 
offensive conduct” was ‘inconsistent with our respect for the dignity of man.’” Id. at 836 
(quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183).  According to the plurality, the execution of fifteen-year-old 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
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In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor also considered both relevant legislative 
enactments and jury behavior to identify a national consensus in opposition to 
executing children who were fifteen years of age at the time of their crimes.56  Most 
relevant to Justice O’Connor was the fact that every legislature allowing for juvenile 
executions that established a minimum age for execution had set the minimum age at 
sixteen.57  Adding to those states the fourteen states that prohibit capital punishment 
all together, it appeared that approximately two-thirds of state legislatures refuse to 
execute fifteen-year-olds.58  Justice O’Connor explained that, in light of the 
legislation, “strong counter-evidence would be required to persuade me that a 
national consensus against this practice does not exist.”59  
When examining the behavior of juries, Justice O’Connor noted that the last time 
a juvenile younger than sixteen years of age was executed occurred more than four 
decades before.60  Only five out of 1,393 criminal homicide offenders under sixteen 
were sentenced to death, leading to the inference that a national consensus exists 
against executing persons fifteen years of age at the time of their offenses.61  Justice 
O’Connor did note, however, that those statistics are not dispositive.62  For example, 
the statistics did not provide the number of times juries were asked to sentence a 
capital defendant under sixteen to death.  The statistics also failed to establish the 
number of times prosecutors refrained from seeking death sentences for those 
persons under age sixteen who were otherwise eligible for death.   
The lynchpin for Justice O’Connor, however, was the fact that nineteen states, 
including Oklahoma, failed to establish a minimum age for death eligibility.63  
O’Connor was unwilling to accept the dissent’s theory that those nineteen states 
deliberately refused to establish a minimum age, thus allowing for the executions of 
fifteen-year-old offenders.64  In light of the fact that every state that had expressly 
established a minimum age for death eligibility set that age at sixteen or older, 
                                                          
minors fails to meet that test. Therefore, based on relevant legislative enactments and the 
behavior of juries, along with an examination of the goals of capital punishment, the execution 
of a juvenile fifteen years of age at the time of the crime offends evolving standards of 
decency.  Id. at 838.  In fact, such executions are “nothing more than the purposeless and 
needless imposition of pain and suffering” and are thus unconstitutional under the Eighth 
Amendment.  Thompson, 487 U.S. 815 at 838. 
56Id. at 365. 
57Thompson, 487 U.S. at 849.  
58See also Id. at 829 n.25.  The fourteen states which prohibit capital punishment 
include:1) Alaska; 2) District of Columbia; 3) Hawaii; 4) Iowa; 5) Kansas; 6) Maine; 7) 
Massachusetts; 8) Michigan; 9) Minnesota; 10) New York; 11) North Dakota; 12) Rhode 
Island; 13) West Virginia; and 14) Wisconsin. 
59Id. at 849. 
60Id. at 852. 
61Id. at 848. 
62Thompson, 487 U.S. at 853. 
63Id. 
64Id. at 850. 
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O’Connor was unwilling to infer a deliberate intent by those nineteen states to 
provide execution for children under sixteen.65 
Most important, O’Connor left the door open for the future when stating 
“adolescents are generally less blameworthy than adults who commit similar crimes-
-it does not necessarily follow that all fifteen-year-olds are incapable of the moral 
culpability that would justify the imposition of capital punishment.”66  O’Connor 
further opined that the plurality failed to produce conclusive evidence that fifteen-
year-olds, as a class, could never be deterred from committing capital offenses by the 
prospect of death.67  In conclusion, O’Connor warned: 
The day may come when we must decide whether a legislature may 
deliberately and unequivocally resolve upon a penalty authorizing capital 
punishment for crimes committed at the age of 15.  In that event . . . we 
shall have to evaluate the evidence of societal standards of decency that is 
available to us at the time.68  
Thus, according to Justice O’Connor, a time may present itself where current 
legislative enactments indicate a national consensus in favor of executing fifteen-
year-olds.  The shift in the national consensus will arise if society regards the fifteen-
year-old child as morally and criminally blameworthy and thus eligible for death. 
The dissent also analyzed the statistical evidence relied upon by the plurality and 
concurrence relating to the number of states allowing executions and those that 
define a minimum age versus those states that prohibit the death penalty under all 
circumstances.  The dissent primarily focused on the fact that nineteen states had not 
defined a minimum age for execution, suggesting that the appropriate age for death 
                                                                
65Id. 
66Id. 
67Thompson, 487 U.S. at 850. 
68Id. at 855.  See also Seung Oh Kang, The Efficacy of Youth as a Mitigating 
Circumstance: Preservation of the Capital Defendant’s Constitutional Rights Pursuant to 
Traditional Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence, 28 SUFFOLK L. REV. 747, 776-77 (1994).  Kang 
reasons: 
Examination of a youth’s culpability discloses a generalization that all juveniles are 
less blameworthy than adults who commit similar crimes, triggering an assumption 
that age disqualifies the youth from death eligibility.  A bright-line test excluding the 
entire class of youths from the death penalty, however, would negate an individualized 
examination of the proportionality of capital punishment to the defendant’s culpability 
and the goals of retribution and deterrence, thus conflicting with the traditional 
fundamental values of the Eighth Amendment.  Age instead serves as a “proxy,” 
which, when analyzed with other factors such as immaturity, lack of sound judgment 
and responsibility, and the inability to properly assess the ramifications of one’s 
conduct, may render the death penalty inappropriate.  Notwithstanding the criticisms 
surrounding youth as a mitigating circumstance, youth constitutes a tenet of 
individualized consideration in the assessment of the capital defendant’s culpability 
and also serves to mitigate the defendant’s actions, not to categorically exempt all 
juvenile defendants from capital punishment.  The utilization of youth as a mitigating 
force to establish automatic diminished culpability of the juvenile defendant would 
offend the precept of the dignity of man and undermine traditional Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1998
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eligibility should be determined on an individualized basis.69  According to the 
dissent, the relevant legislative enactments, along with the behavior of juries suggest 
a national consensus that executing persons fifteen years of age at the time of their 
offenses is both acceptable and rare.70  The dissent reasoned it is absurd to suggest a 
cold-blooded-killer one day under age sixteen can never be eligible for execution.71  
Instead, once a juvenile is transferred to the adult penal system, all of the applicable 
adult penalties, including death, should attach.72  
The question of at what age juveniles become eligible for death was squarely 
presented to the Court one year following Thompson, in the consolidated cases of 
Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri.73  The issue before the Court in both 
cases was whether executing juveniles sixteen and seventeen years of age at the time 
of their offenses constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.74  The Court, using the 
objective factors relied upon in Thompson, held the executions of persons sixteen 
and seventeen years of age at the time of their offenses did not offend evolving 
standards of decency and was thus not violative of the Eighth Amendment 
proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.75   
On January 7, 1981 Kevin Stanford and an accomplice robbed a gas station 
where twenty-year-old Baerbel Poore was working.  After recovering 300 cartons of 
cigarettes, two gallons of fuel, and a small amount of cash, Stanford and friend 
repeatedly raped and sodomized Baerbel.  With their goods secured, Stanford and his 
accomplice kidnapped Baerbel from the premises and drove her to an isolated area.  
Stanford shot her twice, once in the face with the fatal wound to the back of her 
head.76  Stanford was seventeen.  He was ultimately sentenced to death.77 
In the companion case, Heath Wilkins, age sixteen, was convicted and sentenced 
to death for felony murder.78  On July 27, 1985, after approximately two weeks of 
extensive planning, Heath Wilkins, Patrick Stevens, and their other accomplices 
robbed Linda’s Liquor and Deli, a small convenience store owned and operated by 
Nancy Allen and her husband.79  Before committing the robbery, the group stalked 
the deli through the bushes until the remaining customers left.80  Finally, carrying 
                                                                
69Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868. 
70Id. at 870. 
71Id. at 857. 
72Id. at 863-64. 
73Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). 
74Id. at 364-365. 
75Id. at 379. 
76Id. at 365. 
77Id.  
78Stanford, 492 U.S. at 367. 
79Id. at 366. 
80Id. 
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bags stolen from a nearby hospital just minutes before, the group approached the 
deli.81  One of the store’s owners, Nancy Allen, was working that night.82 
In accordance with their premeditated plan, Wilkins approached the counter to 
order a sandwich as Stevens sought refuge in the bathroom directly behind the 
counter.83  When Wilkins ordered the sandwich, Stevens pounced from the bathroom 
and grabbed Nancy.84  Wilkins drove a knife into her back.85  Nancy collapsed on the 
floor, face down where she rolled into a spread eagle position with her back to the 
floor.86  Stevens focused his attention on the cash register, where he quickly 
encountered problems.87  In an effort to help, Nancy spoke.88  Wilkins responded by 
plunging a knife into her chest three more times.89  While she was begging for her 
life, Wilkins stabbed Nancy four more times in the neck.90  The proceeds of the 
robbery consisted of liquor, cigarettes, rolling papers, and approximately $450 in 
cash and checks.91  Nancy Allen was a twenty-six-year-old wife and mother of two 
small children when Wilkins slaughtered her and left her on the deli floor to die.92 
In a five-to-four decision, with Justice O’Connor concurring, the Court held that 
the imposition of death on a capital offender sixteen or seventeen at the time of the 
offense is not cruel and unusual punishment.93  In reaching this conclusion, the 
plurality again considered relevant legislative enactments and jury behavior as 
objective indicia of evolving standards of decency.  
The plurality noted that, at common law and according to Blackstone’s 
Commentaries, theoretically, a child as young as seven can be executed.94  The Court 
further noted that fifteen of the thirty-seven states permitting the death penalty refuse 
to impose death upon sixteen-year-old capital offenders and twelve of the thirty-
seven states refuse to impose death on seventeen-year-old capital offenders.95  
According to the plurality, this indicated a majority consensus that executing sixteen 
and seventeen-year-olds is permissible.96  
                                                                
81Id. 
82Id. 
83Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366. 
84Id. 
85Id. 
86Id. 
87Id. 
88Stanford, 492 U.S. at 366. 
89Id. 
90Id. 
91Id. 
92Id. at 366. 
93Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380. 
94Id. at 368. 
95Id. at 373. 
96Id. 
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The plurality also considered statistics gathered from 1982 through 1988 which 
indicated that only fifteen out of the 2,106 death sentences rendered were imposed 
on offenders under sixteen, while thirty death sentences were imposed on seventeen-
year-old capital offenders.97  The plurality opined that these statistics could be 
regarded not as establishing a national consensus against the death penalty for 
sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders, as defendants argued, but instead as 
evidence of a national consensus in favor of such executions in rare circumstances.98   
The plurality explained that the burden rested with the condemned defendant to 
prove a national consensus against the death penalty for persons sixteen and 
seventeen years of age.99  In order to satisfy that burden, defendants must show “not 
that 17 or 18 is the age at which most persons or even almost all persons achieve 
sufficient maturity to be held fully responsible for murder, but that 17 or 18 is the 
age before which no one can be held fully responsible.”100  Because the majority of 
states who permit capital punishment set the minimum age for death eligibility at 
sixteen, the defendants failed to meet their required burden. 
Finding that defendants, using legislative enactments, failed to prove a national 
consensus against executing sixteen and seventeen-year-old offenders, the plurality 
turned to the behavior of juries.  The statistics indicated that from 1982 through 1988 
only fifteen out of a total of 2,106 death sentences were imposed on defendants who 
were sixteen or younger at the time of their offenses.101  Only thirty death sentences 
were imposed on children under seventeen at the time of the crime.102  In fact, the last 
person younger than seventeen to have been executed was killed in 1959.103  While 
Stanford and Wilkins argued that the statistics indicated a consensus against 
executing persons under eighteen, the plurality argued the contrary; executing 
persons under eighteen is permissible, but should be, and is, only rarely imposed.104 
The plurality also explained that judges are not the appropriate audience for 
determining the existence of a national consensus in favor of or opposition to 
executing sixteen- and seventeen-year-old capital offenders.105  Instead, defendants 
must appeal to and persuade the state citizens.106  Because of their failure to meet 
their respective burdens, Stanford’s and Wilkins’s death sentences were affirmed. 
In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor applied the same two-part test she 
established in Thompson: the constitutionality of the imposition of death on juveniles 
depends upon whether:  1) the state has established a minimum age for death 
eligibility; and 2) whether a national consensus against the death penalty exists. 
                                                                
97Id. at 373. 
98Stanford, 492 U.S. at 374. 
99Id. at 373. 
100Id. at 375. 
101Id. at 373. 
102Id. 
103Stanford, 492 U.S.  at 374. 
104Id. 
105Id. at 378. 
106Id. 
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Because the majority of states established a minimum age of death eligibility at 
sixteen and because the relevant legislative enactments and sentencing behavior of 
juries were consistent with evolving standards of decency, O’Connor reasoned that 
executing sixteen and seventeen-year-old capital offenders is not unconstitutional.107  
Justice O’Connor again warned, however, that “the day may come when there is 
such general legislative rejection of the execution of 16-or 17-year-old capital 
murderers that a national consensus can be said to have developed.”108   
The dissent declared that the imposition of death upon sixteen and seventeen-
year-old offenders is cruel and unusual punishment and unconstitutional per se109 
based on a different interpretation of relevant legislative enactments and jury 
behavior.  In reaching their conclusion, the dissent pointed to the fact that twelve of 
the states permitting capital punishment forbid the imposition of death for persons 
under eighteen.110  When viewed in conjunction with the fifteen states prohibiting 
capital punishment under all circumstances, it appears that twenty-seven states agree 
that persons under eighteen should not be executed.111  Nineteen states do not even 
establish a minimum age, indicating that they “have not squarely faced the 
question.”112 
The dissent acknowledged the plurality’s contention that jury decisions to impose 
death on sixteen- and seventeen year-old capital murderers are rare.  However, that 
fact alone is not conclusive evidence of a national consensus in favor of such 
executions.  In fact: 
Just as we have never insisted that a punishment have been rejected 
unanimously by the states before we may judge it cruel and unusual, so 
we have never adopted the extraordinary view that a punishment is 
beyond the Eighth Amendment challenge if it is sometimes handed down 
by a jury.113  
Consequently, the dissent concluded that the imposition of death on sixteen and 
seventeen-year-old offenders is cruel and unusual punishment.  
As a result of Thompson and Stanford, a bright line has been drawn with regard 
to the minimum age for death eligibility; it is unconstitutional to execute children 
who were fifteen at the time of their crimes, but it is constitutional to execute 
sixteen-year-old offenders.  However, Justice O’Connor concluded the day may 
                                                                
107Id. at 380-81. 
108Stanford, 492 U.S. at 381. 
109Id. at 382. 
110Id. at 371 n.2.  
111See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. at 822-23 (1988); Stanford, 492 U.S. at 384 n.1.  
The fifteenth state to abolish capital punishment was Vermont. 
112Stanford, 492 U.S. at 385.  See also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 829 n.26.  The nineteen 
states failing to establish a minimum age for death eligibility include: 1) Alabama; 2) Arizona; 
3)Arkansas 4)Delaware; 5) Florida; 6) Idaho; 7) Louisiana; 8) Mississippi; 9) Missouri; 10) 
Montana; 11) Oklahoma; 12) Pennsylvania; 13) South Carolina; 14) South Dakota; 15) Utah; 
16) Vermont; 17) Virginia; 18) Washington; and 19) Wyoming.  
113Stanford, 492 U.S. at 386. 
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arrive where our legislative enactments indicate a national consensus that fifteen-
year-olds are both morally and criminally responsible for their acts and thus eligible 
for death.  
The common link between the two cases is the Court’s reliance on “evolving 
standards of decency” for determining death-eligibility.  That standard, however, 
remains undefined and thus standardless.  Instead, the Court has determined that 
relevant legislative enactments and an analysis of past jury behavior are reliable 
indicators of what is decent.  Thus, the Court places the power of constitutional 
interpretation in the hands of politicians. The reliance on politicians to determine the 
contours of the Eighth Amendment’s proscription against cruel and unusual 
punishment not only destroys the basic American promise and ideal of separation of 
powers, but it is also simply indecent.   
IV.  EFFECT OF THOMPSON AND STANFORD:  MODERN DAY NOTIONS OF EVOLVING 
STANDARDS OF INDECENCY 
In light of the increase in publicity surrounding recent brutal murders committed 
by children, the issue facing the nation is whether Thompson will be revisited.  The 
increase in publicity surrounding recent juvenile crimes has led to the dual 
misperceptions that there has been an increase in juvenile crimes and that the 
juvenile justice system has failed in its attempt to rehabilitate violent juvenile 
offenders.114  As a result of both misperceptions, state legislators are lobbying for 
                                                                
114See Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 13, 1997)  In October of 1997, Luke 
Woodham brutally stabbed his mother to death before heading to Pearl High School, in Pearl, 
Mississippi, with a hunting rifle in tow. Woodham entered the school and “pulled the rifle 
from under his coat, walked up to his former girlfriend and shot her to death.  Then . . . he 
sprayed the crowded school commons with gunfire.”  Id.   Woodham killed two girls and 
injured seven others.  According to his letter, also known as his “manifesto,” Woodham 
embarked on his hunting excursion because “people like me are mistreated every day.  I do 
this to show society – push us and we will push back.”  Id.  Luke Woodham is sixteen. 
See also Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 24, 1997).  In November, 1997, an 
effort to raise money for the PTA and possibly win the grand prize pair of walkie-talkies led 
eleven-year-old Eddie Werner on a door-to-door mission in suburban New Jersey, with candy 
for sale.  By the time Eddie knocked on Sam Manzie’s door, he had sold approximately $200 
worth of candy.  Forty-Eight hours later, the police discovered Eddie’s body in woods across 
the street from Manzie’s home.  According to authorities, “Manzie sexually assaulted and 
strangled Eddie, robbed him of his sales money, then hid the body in a suitcase before 
disposing of it in a wooded lot near by.”  Id.  Sam Manzie was fifteen. 
See also NBC Nightly News (Dec. 26, 1997).  Vincente Guevara had been guzzling a few 
beers with his friends when a twenty-three-year-old mother of two crossed his path.  She was 
on her way home from working a double shift at the local 7-11.  Guevara shot her in the back 
of the head.  He “wanted to know what it felt like to kill somebody.”  Guevara was fifteen. 
See also The Today Show (NBC television broadcast, Dec. 2, 1997).  In December, 1997, 
Michael Carneal entered his Heath High School prayer meeting, in Paducah, Kentucky, after 
kindly warning his friend not to be present that day.  Carneal calmly inserted ear plugs into his 
ears, removed the shotgun he had stolen on Thanksgiving day and showered the prayer group 
with bullets.  Carneal killed three girls.  Carneal was fourteen. 
See Ben Dobbin, Parents of Slain 4-Year-Old Still Struggle 4 Years Later, BUFF. NEWS, 
August 10, 1997 at A22.  See also Teenage Murder Denied New Trial, BUFF. NEWS, August 
17, 1997, at A14.  See also Judge Refuses New Trial for Convicted Killer, 17 Eric Smith 
Could be Transferred to an Adult Prison Next Year, SYRACUSE NEWSPAPERS, August 17, 1997, 
at B1.  In 1993, Eric Smith lured four-year-old Derrick Robie into the woods while Robie was 
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reducing the minimum age for waiver of juvenile jurisdiction to provide for adult 
punishments at younger ages.  The logical result of reducing the minimum age for 
transfer eligibility is reducing the minimum age for death eligibility. 
In her Thompson concurrence, O’Connor stated that although most juveniles are 
less criminally blameworthy and less morally culpable than adults “it does not 
necessarily follow that all fifteen-year-olds are incapable of the moral culpability that 
would justify the imposition of capital punishment.”115  O’Connor warned, therefore, 
that the day could come where the evidence would have to be reexamined in order to 
determine a minimum age for death eligibility that is in accordance with the national 
consensus and thus evolving standards of decency.   
A closer look at relevant threatened legislative enactments reveals that perhaps 
the dawn of that day has come.  Society, however, must be weary of any available 
“reliable evidence” of a national consensus in favor of executing fifteen-year-old 
murderers.  The Court has identified legislative enactments as an indicator of a 
national consensus.  Assuming, arguendo, that all people vote, the assumption that 
politicians provide “reliable evidence” of a national consensus is fatally flawed.  
Indeed, it would be disingenuous to suggest that the information presented to the 
people by politicians is objectively reliable.  Politicians present information 
necessary for soliciting votes, not for determining a national consensus.  Thus, the 
reliance on legislative enactments as “reliable evidence” of a national consensus is 
not only misplaced but is dangerous. 
A.  Political Manipulation of Public Misperceptions 
1.  Recent Lobbying Efforts by State Legislators 
In response to societal fear and outrage as a result of violent juvenile crime, some 
states have enacted legislation which depart from and lower the minimum age of 
death eligibility established in Thompson.  For example, in North Carolina, a juvenile 
                                                          
en route to day camp.  According to authorities, “Eric choked the pre-schooler, stuffed a paper 
towel and a plastic lunch bag in his mouth and crushed his skull with a  twenty-six-pound 
rock.  He sodomized the body with a stick.”   Eric Smith was thirteen. 
See also CBS Evening News (Sept. 3, 1994); CBS Evening News (Sept. 12, 1994); CBS 
Evening News (May 16, 1996); CBS Evening News (April 25, 1996); NBC Nightly News (May 
2, 1996).  In High Bridge, New Jersey, eleven-year-old Jacob Tracy was shot in the chest in 
his bedroom by his own friend.  Jacob was killed because he refused to accept an apology 
from another child.  The friend and killer was thirteen. 
See also CBS Evening News (Oct. 14, 1994).  In 1994, five-year-old Eric Morris died 
after being thrown from a Chicago public housing high rise.  He was being beaten while 
dangling over the edge.  Eric’s nine-year-old brother attempted to save him; but, the attackers 
bit Eric’s hands until he let go of the edge and fell fourteen stories to his death.  Eric died from 
massive internal injuries.  His killers were ten and eleven.  They killed Eric because “he had 
refused to steal candy for them.” 
See also Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Oct. 27, 1998).  In 1998, Andrew Golden 
and Mitch Johnson carried out their plot to activate their school fire alarm and, using deer 
rifles stolen from one of their grandfathers, opened-fire on the Jonesboro, Arkansas 
schoolyard.  Four students were killed.  One teacher was killed.  Ten students were injured.  
Johnson was thirteen.  Golden was eleven.   
115Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
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as young as fourteen may be executed if he or she committed murder while being 
incarcerated for murder.116 
In Virginia, a juvenile may be executed at age fifteen.117  Arkansas and Utah 
provide for death at age fourteen.118  South Dakota permits the execution of ten-year-
old capital offenders, following a transfer hearing and trial as an adult.119  Support for 
the death penalty as applied to juveniles under sixteen is further evidenced by the 
fact that several states--Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Montana, South Carolina, 
and Washington -- have not established a minimum age for death.120   
Some recent efforts by state legislators to reduce the minimum age for executions 
include those of California Governor Pete Wilson, who proposed twenty bills before 
the legislature to overhaul the juvenile justice system and allow a “get tough on 
crime” approach to juvenile offenders.121  In a transparent political soundbite, 
Governor Wilson stated his support for executing thirteen- and fourteen-year-old 
offenders, by declaring “no longer . . . will the welfare of the young felons be the 
primary concern of the juvenile system.’ [Instead], the safety of ordinary, law 
abiding citizens must be government’s top priority.”122 
According to Wilson, the death penalty must be an option for children.123  In 
support of Wilson’s poitically fueled declaration, Assemblyman Bustamante stated 
he, too, would “default to say that a hardened criminal is a hardened criminal no 
matter at what age.”124 “[W]ith a tear in [his] eye,”125 Bustamante declared he may 
have no other choice but to support the death penalty for children as young as 
thirteen.126  Quackenbush declared that “the only thing we can do is take these people 
off the street and put them in cages where they belong.”127   
Likewise, in the wake of the Jonesboro shootings, one Arkansas legislator has 
proposed a law enabling prosecutors to charge juveniles with capital murder, without 
regard to age.128  According to the Arkansas lawmaker “the bottom line is, you 
                                                                
116Nanda, supra note 18, at 1313. 
117Id.  See also Capital Punishment, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1996 5 T.4 (revised 
1/15/98). 
118Nanda, supra note 18, at 1313. 
119Id. 
120Id. 
121Carl Ingram, Wilson Proposes Overhaul of Juvenile Justice System Politics: Governor 
Presents 20 Bills to get Tough with Youth Crime, Including a Suggestion that the Minimum 
Age for Death Penalty be Lowered to 14, L.A. TIMES, April 10, 1997, at A3. 
122Id. 
123Vincent J. Schodolski, 2 California Officials Suggest 13-Year-Olds Face Death 
Penalty, CHI. TRIB., April 15, 1997, at 6. 
124Id. 
125Id. 
126Id. 
127Id. 
128CBS Evening News (Jan. 8, 1994). 
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commit premeditated murder and all the parts of the system say you should be 
accountable as an adult, you can be held accountable as an adult.”129  Also as a result 
of the Jonesboro shootings, a Texas legislator proposed a bill allowing for the 
imposition of death sentences for children as young as eleven, postponing executions 
until they reach age seventeen.130 
2.  Perceived Increase in Juvenile Crime 
State legislators base their political platforms on juvenile crime, rallying around 
the public misperception that violent juvenile crimes are on the rise.  Yet, the most 
recent report issued by the FBI indicates that the occurrence of juvenile crime has 
decreased.131  Furthermore, in 1992, 66% of the crimes committed by juveniles were 
property offenses, drug offenses, and public order offenses, as opposed to violent 
acts committed against other persons.132  The perception that there is an upward trend 
in juvenile crime is mistaken.  Instead, there is an upward trend in waiver of juvenile 
jurisdiction.133 
Legislators argue that the failure of the juvenile justice system to rehabilitate 
juvenile offenders before they kill justifies adult trials and adult punishments, 
including death.  One commentator argues the philosophy on which the juvenile 
justice system was founded is from a “bygone era.”134  “Yesterday’s delinquents had 
fist-fights, shoplifted, and stole bikes and cars; today, they are armed with deadly 
weapons and devoid of respect for others as they commit burglaries, rapes, and 
murders.”135 
These recent lobbying efforts by state legislators, when viewed in conjunction 
with the states currently allowing the executions of children between ages ten and 
fourteen indicate a growing national consensus in support of executing children 
under sixteen.  Because of the perceived failure of the juvenile justice system to 
rehabilitate juvenile offenders before they kill, adult trials and adult punishments 
may become justified.  What remains unsaid and unrecognized, however, is that the 
failure of the juvenile justice system is the failure to rehabilitate the juvenile--not the 
failure of the juvenile to be rehabilitated. 
                                                                
129Dateline (NBC television broacast, Mar. 27, 1998) 
130Id. 
1314/24/98 Agence France-Presse. 
132Laureen D’Ambra, A Legal Response to Juvenile Crime: Why Waiver of Juvenile 
Offenders is not a Pancea, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 277, 282 (1997). 
133Katherine Hunt Federle, Emancipation & Execution: Transferring Children to Criminal 
Court in Capital Cases, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 447, 486 (1996). 
134D’Ambra, supra note 132, at 281. 
135Id. at 281-82. 
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B.  The Failure of the Juvenile Justice System 
1.  Failure of the Juvenile Justice System to Rehabilitate 
In 1996, a twelve- and thirteen-year-old became the youngest inmates at a 
maximum security prison.136  The two children were convicted at ages ten and eleven 
for the murder of five-year-old Eric Morris. They dropped Eric fourteen stories to his 
death for his refusal to steal candy for them.137  The young inmates were sent to 
prison following a Chicago judge’s rejection of the defense claim that the children 
were in need of psychiatric assistance.138  Instead, the judge chose to place great 
weight on the fact that both boys had appeared in court on numerous occasions prior 
to murdering Eric.139  Each time they appeared in juvenile court, instead of being 
given treatment, they were sent back to their debilitated homes in the projects of 
Chicago.140  While Eric’s murder and the subsequent waiver of jurisdiction over the 
two young killers can be perceived to be a failure of the juvenile justice system to 
rehabilitate two “monsters,”141 it can also be perceived as a failure of the court to 
provide rehabilitation. 
Similarly, three days prior to sodomizing, robbing, and murdering eleven-year-
old Eddie Werner on his mission to sell candy door-to-door, Sam Manzie’s parents 
appeared in Judge Citta’s family court asking that their son Sam be committed to a 
twenty-four-hour in-patient psychiatric facility.142  The Manzies were afraid of their 
son.143  Ordinary out-patient counseling was of no avail.  Judge Citta responded that 
the juvenile system lacked funding to provide Manzie with in-patient hospitalization: 
I can only tell you, Samuel, that you have got to do the right thing . . . I 
am also going to assume that you love your parents, and it’s obvious to 
me that they care for you, but they’re afraid.  And I don’t know whether 
you’re a violent guy . . .  I’m going to make your parents take you home.  
You are 15-years-old.  You must follow their rules.  You’re not mentally 
disturbed in any way.  You’re not a psychopath.  No?  Remember the 
difference between right and wrong and it will be fine.  Good luck to 
you.144 
Three days later, Eddie Werner knocked on Sam Manzie’s door.145   
                                                                
136Michelle I. Baird & Mina B. Samuels, Justice for Youth: Betrayal of Childhood in the 
United States, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 177-78 (1996). 
137Id. 
138Id. at 177. 
139Id. at 177-78. 
140Id. at 178. 
141Baird & Samuels, supra note 136, at 178. 
142
 Dateline, supra note 4. 
143Id. 
144Id. 
145Id. 
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Again, the juvenile justice system denied a juvenile treatment for a lack of 
resources; the result was murder.  Thus, the failure of the juvenile justice system to 
rehabilitate young felons lies not on the failure of the felon to be rehabilitated.  
Instead, the failure of the juvenile justice system is the failure to rehabilitate young 
felons.146   
V.  SOCIETAL RESPONSE TO POLITICAL MANIPULATION OF PUBLIC MISPERCEPTIONS 
A.  A Reversion Back to Colonial Theories of Punishment 
With the misperceptions that violent juvenile crime is on the rise and that 
juvenile murderers are not amenable to rehabilitation, comes the politically fueled 
and media-fed misperception that the only viable alternative is to transfer the young 
killers to adult prison to face execution.  Not only does this “solution” ignore the 
problem of inadequate juvenile “rehabilitation” facilities which serve as a 
fundamental contributing factor to juvenile violence, but it also represents 
abandonment of these children. 
It is societal frustration and fear that are the vehicles for ultimately redefining our 
standards of decency. However, society must be weary of political manipulation by 
legislators when determining that a national consensus exists in favor of executing 
children who are under the age of sixteen. Fear is leading Americans to call for 
tougher sanctions for juvenile offenders.  Americans want juveniles to be punished 
and sentenced as adults.147 A recent survey conducted in response to the highly-
                                                                
146Id.  See also Teen Murder Suspect Confused about Sexuality Parents Say, REC. N. N. J., 
October 31, 1997, at AO2.  
147Disturbingly, the failure to offer rehabilitation extends far beyond merely denying 
psychiatric assistance to needy children.  The failure of treatment has penetrated the walls of 
juvenile facilities to create deplorable dehumanizing and anti-rehabilitative conditions.  
Conditions under which juveniles are confined prior to and following an adjudication of 
delinquency are harsh and penal in nature.  According to one commentator, “while some 
juvenile institutions may look like ‘home,’ most juvenile facilities resemble adult prisons.”  
See Baird & Samules, supra note 108 at 182-83.  Overcrowding is a continuous problem.  
Some children are forced to sleep on cement floors due to a lack of bedding.  Id.  The confined 
juveniles are not given adequate supervision due to under-staffing.  Id.  Behavior problems 
often result, calling for an increase in use of leg shackles and handcuffs, and four-point 
restraints.  Id.  Furthermore, every year, 11,500 out of 65,000 incarcerated children perform 
suicidal acts.  Id. at 198.  With the overcrowding, lack of supervision, and increase in use of 
restraints comes a lack of available treatment and counseling.  Id. at 182.  A recent study of 
juvenile institutions conducted in New York revealed that the boys’ and girls’ facilities are 
“characterized by high recidivism, homosexuality, inadequate treatment, poorly trained staff, 
and numerous other signs of failure.”  See Mnookin, supra note 26 at 1103-1107.  
Several cases have appeared before courts throughout the states challenging the 
constitutionality of the conditions in juvenile facilities.  In an Indiana correctional facility, 
boys between the ages of twelve and eighteen were being beaten with two inch thick fraternity 
paddles.  One boy, weighing 160 pounds, was beaten with the paddle by a staff member 
weighing 285 pounds.  See Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 354 (1974).  The injuries sustained 
by the beatings were such that one child was forced to sleep on his face for three nights as a 
result of severe bruising and blistering.  Id. 
In Ohio, two children who were placed under juvenile court jurisdiction following 
adjudications of delinquency, were transferred to Cleveland’s old County Jail to be “scared 
straight.”  See Doe v. McFaul, 599 F.Supp. 1421, 1423 (1984).  Judge Leodis Harris instituted 
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publicized juvenile murders indicates that a majority of Americans are in favor of 
trying juveniles murderers as adults.148  Fifty-six percent of Americans believe that 
children under thirteen should be tried as adults and face adult punishments.149  
However, legislators fail to mention in their efforts to perpetuate and manipulate 
societal outrage and fear, the cases such as Sam Manzie’s where, despite parental 
pleas of concern, judges refuse to provide the necessary juvenile treatment for lack 
of financial resources.150   
Instead, legislators tailor their political platforms on the misperception that the 
juvenile justice system has failed to rehabilitate these cold-blooded criminals.  
Legislators depend on the power of public panic and political manipulation of 
society’s misperception that juvenile crimes are on the rise.  Politicians feed on and 
fuel societal fear by advocating a “get-tough” approach to juvenile crime in the 
aftermath of school-yard shootings and random murders committed to “know what it 
[feels] like to kill somebody.”  In the words of one author, “anything less than the 
                                                          
the program without making arrangements with the jail for handling the juveniles and without 
regard to warnings by a corrections officer that the jail was unable to accommodate “juvenile 
guests.”  Id. at 1426.  As a result, the two boys fell victim to homosexual rape by inmates 
awaiting bind over to adult court and inmates who were already bound over for adult 
punishment.  Id. at 1427. 
In Rhode Island, boys who were deemed delinquent, neglected, dependent and wayward, 
along with boys who were voluntarily committed to the school by their parents, were 
subjected to what the court described as “cruelty . . . much more comparable to the Chinese 
water torture than to such cruelties as breaking on the wheel.”  See Inmates of Boys of Boys’ 
Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1359-66 (1972).  As a result of disciplinary 
and escape problems, some juveniles were transferred from their cottages to either the wing of 
an old woman’s reformatory or a maximum security wing of the Adult Correctional Institute 
(ACI).  Id. at 1359.  The boys were placed in cold dark cement cells, containing only a bed, 
sink, and toilet.  Id.  The windows were barred and the toilets could only be flushed by guards 
outside the cell.  Id. at 1359.  The juveniles were denied access to medical care, education, 
artificial lighting, food, exercise, and visitor contacts.  Id.  Some children were housed with 
adult prisoners, who subjected them to homosexual overtures and physical threats.  Id. at 1361. 
Other children were placed in solitary confinement; the boys were not given toilet paper, 
soap, sheets, blankets, or a change of clothes.  Id. at 1362.  They were only permitted to wear 
underwear.  Id. at 1360.  Confinement could last up to seven days.  In declaring such 
conditions unconstitutional, the Rhode Island District Court found the bug-out cells were 
“similar to those used to test experimentally the effects of sensory deprivation; well-adjusted 
adult volunteers have been found to hallucinate in such an environment in a matter of hours.”  
Id. 
The rehabilitative capacities of the juvenile system are hardly conducive to providing 
effective treatment and rehabilitation.  Instead of providing treatment, the system provides 
overcrowded cells.  The overcrowding leads not only to supervisory concerns, but also to 
safety concerns.  Most significantly, juveniles who are incarcerated in adult facilities are more 
likely to become educated on how to become a polished career criminal than to be educated on 
how to conform their conduct so as to contribute positively to society.  Thus, upon release, the 
juveniles are likely to continue along the same destructive path.  Executions, however, are not 
the solution. Instead, juvenile facilities must be revamped and restructured so as to 
accomodate young felons with life sentences. 
148D’Ambra, supra note 132, at 299. 
149Dateline (NBC television broadcast, Mar. 27, 1998). 
150Id. 
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harshest sentence is seen as ‘coddling’ of a young criminal.”151  The public is 
manipulated into believing their hands are tied with regard to juvenile crime and the 
only viable alternative is to lower  the minimum age for execution. 
Instead of overhauling the juvenile justice system to provide the necessary 
treatment and obtain the necessary resources, executions are promised.  However, 
even in the face of transparent political soundbites, the commission of a violent 
offense, while unacceptable, does not transform the juvenile into an adult.152  Yet, 
“get-tough policies try to solve the problem of juvenile crime by lowering the age of 
adulthood rather than recognizing the problem as a failure of society.”153  By 
lowering the minimum age for death eligibility, we will be reverting back to colonial 
theories of punishment and applying a rebuttable presumption of criminal intent to 
children between seven and fourteen.  The goals of treatment and rehabilitation for 
juveniles will be forced out the window and the result will be a Seventeenth Century 
system of punishment. 
B.  “Evolving” Standards of Indecency & Constitutional Misinterpretation 
The Court’s past and current reliance on the undefined “standards of decency” 
has opened the door to severe repercussions.  The Court, in focusing on legislation as 
an indication of our “evolving standards of decency” provides politicians with the 
power of constitutional interpretation.  Courts have the power to interpret the Eighth 
Amendment.  What is cruel and unusual punishment, under the Eighth Amendment, 
will be determined by the politically-fueled- and media-fed misperceptions that 
juvenile crimes are on the rise and that juveniles are not capable of rehabilitation if 
the current system is left untouched.  Thus, the contours of the Eighth Amendment 
will be defined by standards of indecency. 
“Evolving” standards of decency implies that, with the passage of time, our 
standards, as Americans, have improved since colonial times, where punishments 
were nothing less than barbaric.154  However, if our standards of decency have 
“evolved” such that we will allow the execution of children under age sixteen and as 
                                                                
151See supra note 86 and supporting text. 
152Baird & Samuels, supra note 136, at 181. 
153Kristina H. Chung, Kids Behind Bars: The Legality of Incarcerating Juveniles in Adult 
Jails, 66 IND. L. J. 999, 1012 (1991).  See also D’Ambra, supra note 132, at 295. 
154Punishments for crimes in colonial times and 17th century England were nothing less 
than barbaric.  One commentator notes that, upon arrival to North America in the 16th century, 
Quakers were “‘whipped, pilloried, stocked, caged, imprisoned, laid neck and heels, and 
maimed” by New England’s Christians.”  See Nanda, supra note 18, at 1321.  A favorite 
method of punishment was the “ducking stool,” where a woman was tied to a chair and 
“plung[ed]. . . under water ‘ as often as the sentence direct[ed] in order to cool her immoderate 
heat.’”  Id. 
Common methods of execution included death by hanging, burning, and breaking on the 
wheel.  Id.  The United States Supreme Court, in Wilkerson v. Utah, referred to cases where 
prisoners accused of treason were drawn or dragged to their executions, or, in cases of high 
treason, where prisoners were embowelled alive, beheaded and quartered.  See Wilkerson v. 
Utah, 99 U.S. 130 (1878).  Women accused of treason were commonly burned alive.  Nanda, 
supra note 18, at 1321.  Prisoners convicted of murder faced public dissection, regardless of 
their age.  Id. 
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young as ten, the inescapable truth is that we have traded our standards of decency 
with a rebuttable presumption of intent and thus reverted back to colonial theories of 
punishment.155 
If juveniles were provided with the necessary treatment--or any treatment--upon 
first entering the system, these children would likely not reappear to face transfer 
proceedings following a later and possibly preventable commission of a brutal 
murder.156  While it may appear that a civilized society is incapable of committing 
uncivilized crimes, the events surrounding the 1944 execution of the youngest child 
this century stand as a reminder not only of the possibilities, but of our 
capabilities.157  On June 16, 1944, George Stinney Jr. was executed by electrocution 
approximately two months following his conviction for murdering an 11-year-old 
white South Carolina girl.158  The trial occurred amidst a political election.  The jury 
deliberated for five minutes.  It recommended death without mercy.  George Stinney 
was fourteen. 
Stinney, five feet and one inch tall, weighing ninety-five pounds, began his walk 
to the death chamber, despite public appeals, including those from the victim’s 
family, to spare his life.  One commentator reports: 
A bible — a gift from the sheriff — was tucked under his arm when he 
entered the room . . . the ‘guards had difficulty strapping the boy’s slight 
form into the wooden chair built for adults’ . . . young Stinney was such 
as small boy that it was difficult to attach the electrode to his right leg.’  
Stinney said nothing before the mask was lowered over his face.  The 
Record reporter observed that after the first 2,400 volts passed through the 
boy’s body,‘the death mask slipped from his face and his eyes were open 
when two additional shots of 1,200 and 500 volts followed.’  James 
Gamble . . . remembers . . . ‘his head went up and the mask came of his 
face . . and saliva and all was coming out of his mouth and tears from his 
eyes.159 
If today’s children were to face the same fate, our “standards of decency” will 
have become wicked. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Prosecutors are actively seeking the death penalty for children under sixteen 
arguing the law is unsettled as a result of the plurality opinion in Thompson.160  It 
follows that there has been an increase in publicity of recent juvenile crimes, with a 
special focus on those children fifteen and younger.  As an alternative to reducing the 
minimum age of execution, the goals of treatment and rehabilitation should be re-
                                                                
155See supra note 126. 
156See supra note 114 and supporting text. 
157David I. Bruck, Executing Teen Killers Again.  The 14-Year-Old Who, in Many Ways, 
was too Small for the Chair, WASH. POST, September 15, 1985, at D01. 
158Id 
159Id. 
160Strater, supra note 3, at 156. 
22https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol46/iss4/8
1998] EVOLVING STANDARDS OF INDECENCY 823 
examined and revitalized.  While proponents rely on the apparent inability of the 
juvenile justice system to rehabilitate juveniles when they first enter the system, the 
actions of judges make clear that the juvenile system is often robbed of the 
opportunity to treat and rehabilitate at-risk juveniles.161  The result is often murder.  
Instead of executing children, society must recognize that the failure of the juvenile 
justice system is the failure to rehabilitate the child--not the child’s failure to be 
rehabilitated. 
If society does, in fact, determine that the minimum age of execution should be 
reduced, the dilemma again will be where to draw the line.  Using our evolving 
standards of indecency,  we will inevitably revert back to colonial theories of 
punishment by applying a rebuttable presumption of culpability to children between 
seven and fourteen.  Under the guise of a national consensus, we will create child-
sized death chambers to accommodate the tiny frames of children smaller and 
younger than Stinney.  In the end, our standards will have “evolved” to become 
wicked. 
JENNIFER L. WHITNEY162 
                                                                
161See supra note 116 and supporting text. 
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